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THE ROAD LESS TRAVELED: THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S
PRESERVATION OF JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY
IN AN IMPERFECT WORLD
I.

INTRODUCTION

Calls for recusal have made headlines recently, and in diverse situations,1 including Justice Scalia's pledge2 and his duckhunt, 3 Justice Breyer
and his sentencing commission, 4 and even Judge Ito in his oversight of the
O.J. Simpson murder trial. 5 Judicial recusal provides a little-used method
for achieving society's goal of an unbiased judicial process. 6 In deciding
recusal motions, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that " [ t] he
1. See generally Dan Margolies, Petitions May Delay Retrial in Westar Case, KANSAS
CiWy STAR, Apr. 19, 2005, at D8, availableat 2005 WL 6060702 (reporting impact of
judge's refusal to recuse herself following criticism of defendants' attorneys as
"contemptuous"); Jeffrey Meitrodt, Oyster Farmers' $661 Million in Awards Tossed on
Appeal TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 10, 2004, Nat'l, at 2, available at 2004 WLNR 1500408
(explaining appellate court's decision to affirm judge's refusal to recuse, despite
finding judge's role in drafting clause at issue created appearance of bias).
2. See Todd Collins, Lost in the Forest of the Establishment Clause, 27 CAMPBELL L.
REv. 1, 24 (2004) (describing Justice Scalia's recusal from case involving Pledge of
Allegiance in schools due to prior comments concerning Pledge).
3. See Findlaw.com, Editorial Cartoons and Articles ConcerningJustice Scalia's Role
in Cheney Case, at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/scotus/chny22304scrbr

fex3.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2005) (compiling (mostly negative) editorial cartoons
and articles reporting on Justice Scalia's refusal to recuse from case involving Vice

President Cheney after, subsequent to Court granting certiorari, both Vice President and Justice Scalia were involved in hunting trip together).
4. See Tony Mauro, Breyer Sought Advice on Whether to Recuse in Sentencing Case,
LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 17, 2005, at 10 (describing conflict of interestJustice Breyer, as
former head of United States Sentencing Commission, is likely to face in United
States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005) when reviewing constitutionality of Federal
Sentencing Guidelines).
5. See RICHARD E. FLAMM,JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DIsQuALIFI-

OFJUDGES 1 (1996) (explaining calls forJudge Lance Ito to step down from
bench in 0.J. Simpson murder trial-which he denied-after he admitted bias
against testifying Los Angeles police officer who was critical of Judge Ito's wife).
6. See Kenneth S. Kilimnik, Recusal StandardsforJudges in Pennsylvania, 36 VILL.
L. REv. 713, 724 (1991) (noting that attorneys raise very few recusal motions because such motions are rarely granted and fear of antagonizing sitting judges);
Ronald J. Riccio, Court Rules on Power to Detain Prisonersof the War on Terror and on
the Limits of the "Bush Doctrine," 177 N.J. LJ. 321,July 26, 2004 (explaining that, in
response to congressional concern following Justice Scalia's refusal to recuse himself from Cheney v. United States District Court, Supreme Court has created task force
led by Justice Breyer to "address congressional criticism suggesting that judges
need to do a better job in policing themselves"); see also Susan B. Hoekema, Comment, Questioning the Impartiality of Judges: Disqualifying Federal District Court Judges
Under 28 U S.C. § 455(a), 60 TEMP. L.Q. 697, 697 (1987) (arguing that "an impartial
judiciary is an essential element ofjustice in the United States," and that "Congress
has sought to secure the impartiality of trial judges by requiring judges to disqualify themselves in various situations").
CATION
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touchstone of recusal is the integrity of the judiciary ... ."7 Without the
current judicial recusal laws, neither American judges nor parties to suits
would have the ability to remove cases from decisionmakers who are biased in appearance or in fact. 8 With origins in the early British common
law, American use ofjudicial recusal dates back to early colonial times and
9
is an integral part of our adversarial system of justice.
Three sections of the United States Code provide the primary means
10
These statutes
for challenging and removing biased decisionmakers.
permit parties to bring motions for recusal, as well as for judges to recuse
themselves sua sponte.11 Although the statutes are unclear in the forms of
bias they prohibit, the courts have developed some specificity through ex12
When comtensive interpretation during the doctrine's long existence.
of
interpretation
Circuit's
pared to the trends of other circuits, the Third
as
well
parties,
these statutes reflects a forum more favorable to motioning
13
as more active in preserving the bench's neutrality.
7. United States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568, 573 n.7 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that goal
of recusal remedy was not unbiased judiciary but perception of one); see also Roger
J. Miner, JudicialEthics in the Twenty-First Century: Tracingthe Trends', 32 HOFsTRA L.
REv. 1107, 1110 (2004) (determining that "in modern-day society, it is perception,
rather than reality, that has the greater importance").
8. See Debra Lyn Bassett, JudicialDisqualificationin the FederalAppellate Courts,
87 IowA L. REv. 1213, 1221-22 (2002) (noting that recusal, although highly flawed,
is only method to obtain removal of federal appeals judge); see also FLAMM, supra
note 5, at 35-37 (explaining breadth of federal statutes relative to limited protection of Due Process Clause), Although a party may also move for a new judge or
justice due to bias or interest under the Due Process Clause, the three federal
statutes provide a more strenuous review of judicial activity, effectively eliminating
any due process challenge as superfluous. See id. (discrediting usefulness of due
process challenges).
9. See FLAMM, supra note 5, at 7 (describing development of American recusal
doctrine).
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 47 (2001) (prohibiting judges from hearing appeal of case
they presided over at trial level); id. § 144 (requiring judges to recuse themselves
after satisfactory motion that actual bias exists); id. § 455 (ordering recusal, either
sua sponte or by motion, for appearance of partiality or for conflict of interest);
Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEx. L. REv. 431, 460-61 (2004) (explaining that
recusal is useful, but problematic, method of preventing and correcting bad judging). Although some judges may argue that complete removal of a case is an
overly aggressive solution, it pales in comparison to the mandatory death penalty
for ethical violations while on the bench found in both the French Ancien Regime
and England in the late middle ages. See MARY L. VOLCANSEK ET AL., JUDICIAL MISCONDucT: A CROSs-NATIONAL COMPARISON 127 (1996) (describing draconian methods of punishing judicial impropriety once found in Europe and their
replacement with public humiliation of making inappropriate behavior public).
11. For a discussion on the statutory methods for obtaining recusal, see supra
note 10 and accompanying text.
12. See Hoekema, supra note 6, at 712-13 (1987) (describing judicial gloss that
has been placed upon vague text of §§ 144 and 455).
13. For a discussion of the primary recusal questions upon which circuit
courts have split and the Third Circuit's tendency to determine these issues in
favor of recusal, see infra notes 92-136 and accompanying text.
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Section
Three sections of the United States Code address recusal.
144 prohibits the sitting of judges against whom a valid affidavit of actual
15
Little-used § 47 estops judges
bias toward a party has been submitted.
16
Secfrom sitting on the appeals of cases they oversaw at the trial level.
tion 455, arguably the most important of the recusal provisions, prevents a
17
In
judge who is actually partial or who appears to be partial from sitting.
combination, these statutes and their predecessors have provided the last
18
line of defense for the unbiased American judiciary.
This Casebrief explains the Third Circuit's approach to interpreting
19
Part II notes the developand enforcing these three recusal statutes.
in the Third Cirinterpretation
ment of each of the statutes and their
20
cases
in light of the
Part III analyzes the primary Third Circuit
cuit.

14. See

FED.

JUD.

CTR.,

REcUSAL

ANALYSIS OF CASE

LAw UNDER 28 U.S.C.

§§ 455 & 144 1 (2002) (summarizing federal recusal statutes).
15. See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (providing for recusal for bias or prejudice). Section
144 states:
Bias or prejudice of judge: Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge
before whom the matter pending has a personal bias or prejudice either
against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no
further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding. The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief
that bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days
before the beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard,
or good cause shall be shown for failure to file it within such time. A
party may file only one such affidavit in any case. It shall be accompanied
by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made in good faith.
Id.
16. See 28 U.S.C. § 47 ("No judge shall hear or determine an appeal from the
decision of a case or issue tried by him."); FED. JUD. CR., supra note 14, at 52-53
(noting that Section 47's prohibitions are "little-used").
17. See Hoekema, supra note 6, at 698 (describing § 455 as "paramount disqualification statute"); see also 28 U.S.C. § 455 (enacting rules for disqualification).
Section 455 states:
Disqualification of justice, judge, or magistrate:
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify
himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances: ...
served as a lawyer in the matter in
[w] here he has a personal bias....

controversy, . . . [he] has a [direct or indirect] financial interest in the
subject matter in controversy...
(e) No... judge.., shall accept from the parties a waiver of any ground
for disqualification enumerated in subsection (b) ....
Id.
18. See Hoekema, supranote 6, at 697 (noting importance of unbiased judiciary and Congress's long history of pursuing this goal through recusal statutes).
19. For a general discussion of the American recusal doctrine, see supra notes
1-18 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's recusal practices in comparison to those of other circuits, see infra notes 20-143 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the origins of the recusal doctrine, see infra notes 2491 and accompanying text.
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statutes' dual goals of preserving an unbiased judiciary and preserving judicial independence. 21 Additionally, Part III compares the Third Circuit's
views with the interpretations of other circuits. 2 2 Part IV briefly summarizes the current state of the judicial recusal doctrine-both in the Third
Circuit and nationwide-and includes a cautionary note for attorneys who
23
are considering the employment of this extreme remedy.
II.

THE

A.

DEVELOPMENT OF RECUSAL

Origins of the Doctrine

The concept of recusal dates back to early Jewish law and the Roman
Empire. 2 4 The Babylonian Talmud (the "Talmud"), a book of Jewish law
from the third century A.D., created strict prohibitions on judges' interactions with parties. 25 Under the Talmud, judges were required to recuse
themselves "when a litigant was his friend, someone he disliked, or a kinsman." 26 The Talmud also cautioned that "even a judge who had refused a
trivial favor from a litigant might find himself leaning in [the litigant's]
favor." 27 The Roman Empire's CorpusJuris Civilis, similar to the current
§ 455, permitted parties to request recusal when they believed ajudge was
"under suspicion." 28
Recusal law has developed with two distinct components, adopted to
differing degrees in the various modem legal systems. 29 The first of these
components is interest, implicated when a judge may personally gain an
21. For a discussion of Third Circuit case law, see infra notes 82-115.
22. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's resolution to the inter-circuit conflicts regarding the recusal doctrine, see infra notes 126-36.
. 23. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's pro-movant stance, see infra notes
137-43.
24. See FLAMM, supra note 5, at 6 (describing earliest recordings of recusal
doctrine).
25. See CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, Talmud, at http://www.newadvent.org/
cathen/14435b.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2005) (explaining that Babylonian Talmud
developed from version of Mishna brought to Babylon by Aba Areka, who died in
247 A.D.). Experts believe The Babylonian Talmud was codified and completed in
the fifth and sixth centuries A.D. See id. (outlining history of Babylonian Talmud).
26. See id. (describing Babylonian Talmuds origins in third century A.D.).
27. SeeJohn Leubsdorf, Theories ofJudging andJudgeDisqualification,62 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 237, 248 n.65 (1987) (citing Code of Maimonides and Babylonian Talmud in
describing Jewish law's recognition of man's propensity toward bias).
28. See FLAMM, supra note 5, at 6 (explaining that this expansive disqualification statute mimics modem statutes in civil law nations). The statute reads: "Although a judge has been appointed by imperial power, yet because it is our
pleasure that all litigations should proceed without suspicion, let it be permitted to
him, who thinks the judge under suspicion, to recuse him before the issue is
joined, so that the cause go to another." Id. (quoting CorpusJuris Civilis, Codex of
Justinian, lib. 3, tit. 1, no. 16, trans. in Harrington Putnam, Recusation, 9 CORNELL
L.Q. 1, 3 n.10 (1923)).
29. See id. at 7 (explaining development of recusal doctrine through two distinct and disparately accepted branches).
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advantage or profit from the outcome of the case.3 0 The second of these
two components is bias, defined as a partiality for or against a party by a
31
sitting judge.
Early British law adopted the Roman tradition of requiring recusal for
interest, but-unlike the Romans-the British did not require recusal for
bias. 32 This British theory of absolute judicial impartiality continued to
dominate until relatively recently, as bias did not even justify recusal when
33
a judge found himself sitting on a case directly involving his family.
Only during the twentieth century were the grounds for recusal in Britain
conclusively expanded to include both interest and bias. 3 4 Britain's continuing focus on judicial independence over judicial accountability has
35
been shared historically by the civil law states of France and Italy.
B.

The American Development of Recusal

The more inclusive American recusal doctrine does share an emphasis-although less distinct-on judicial independence over accountability
with Britain and the aforementioned civil law states. 36 Despite the common law system of weak judicial oversight Britain brought to the colonies,3 7 the grounds for recusal-based accountability were quickly
30. See Charles Malarkey, JudicialDisqualification:Is Sexual OrientationCause in
California,41 HASTINGS L.J. 695, 703 (1990) (drawing distinction between court's
historical interpretation of bias and interest).
31. See id. (defining bias and contrasting it with interest).
32. See FLAMM, supra note 5, at 7 (drawing distinctions between common law
recusal and American development of recusal).
33. See id. at 7 n.8 (noting extent of "common law presumption of absolute
impartiality" and its application to Brookes v. Rivers, 1 Hardres 503, 145 Eng. Rep.
569 (Ex. 1668), in which judge presided over his brother-in-law's case). Even when
interest did exist, the rule of necessity-first invoked in 1430-permitted judges to
preside over cases despite a personal interest if an alternate judge was not available. See id. at 9 (reciting extremes of British doctrine). This rule of necessity even
permitted judges to preside over cases to which they were a party. See id. (recounting rule of necessity's seemingly unfair results). Interestingly, British judges were
not permitted to try cases in their county of birth-presumably for fear of locallydeveloped bias-until 1739. See id. at 8-9 (contrasting deferential rule of necessity
with restraining geographic rule).
34. See id. at 9-10 (explaining that, although civil law countries followed Roman law doctrines of both bias and interest throughout their development, British
law only recently expanded grounds for recusal beyond showing of judge's direct
financial interest in case). A presumption of absolute impartiality continued well
into modem times in Britain, as Lord Justice Stratton's 1920 address to the Cambridge Law Society stated that "in England people were inclined to treat the incorruptability of judges as such a matter of course that it was superfluous to even
mention it." Id. at 7 n.8.
35. See VoLcANsrK, supra note 10, at 127 (noting uniform preference for judicial independence over accountability in legal systems of United States, Britain,
France and Italy).
36. See id. at 128 (concluding that judicial systems of United States, Britain,
France and Italy favor judicial independence over accountability).
37. See id. at 87 (noting that, although both state and federal judicial systems
borrowed from British, similarities were, and are, more pronounced in federal
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expanded beyond direct financial interest following American independence. 38 Federal legislative acts of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries required recusal for participating in the issue at hand, interest or a
prior role as counsel for a party (1792), 39 improper connections to a party
(in the view of the judge) (1821)40 and prohibited trial judges from hearing cases again upon appeal (1891).41 These statutory expansions and the

increasingly broad judicial interpretations of the vague recusal statutes reflected acceptance of expanded grounds for recusal. 42 Unfortunately, as
one author notes, this increased accountability has brought about an
equal increase in the uncertainty over the appropriate limits of judicial
43
disqualification.
C.
1.

The Modern Recusal Statutes: Sections 47, 144 and 455

Development of the Modern American Recusal Statutes

Congress created the first federal judicial disqualification statute in
1792. 44 This statute was amended and expanded on numerous occasions
prior to further codification in the Judicial Code of 1911.45 Congress divided the statute's 1948 version of recusal law into three statutory provisions: Sections 47, 144 and 455.46 Although amended to correct
unforeseen interpretive difficulties, the 1948 versions remain largely incourts). The individual states have "total autonomy" from the federal system in the
United States. Id. at 104 (describing separation of powers between states and federal government). Such autonomy allowed the newly independent states to display
their distrust of centralized power by requiring legislative approval of nominees.
Id. at 104-05 (explaining why states retained power over judiciary).
38. See FLAMM, supranote 5, at 10-11 (explaining that, as early as 1792, United
States required judicial recusal for more than judge's financial 'interest in case).
The first recusal statute, created in 1792, required recusal when a judge had an
"interest, had acted in the cause or had been of counsel." Id. at 11 n.4 (citing Act
of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 278). Many states began to diverge from the
British tradition in colonial times, including a 1672 Connecticut statute requiring
recusal for certain familial relationships with parties. Id. at 39 n.6 (citing CONN.
GEN. STAT. of 1672).
39. See Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 278 (providing original guidelines for recusal).
40. See Act of Mar. 3, 1821, ch. 51, § 1, 3 Stat. 643 (expanding grounds for

recusal).
41. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 3, 26 Stat. 643 (enacting predecessor to

§ 47).
42. See FLAMM, supra note 5, at 1 n.7-9 (listing court cases from second half of
twentieth century that expanded recusal doctrine).
43. See id. at 11 (explaining advantages of rigid, yet clearly defined, common
law rule over presently developing, broad and ill-defined rule for recusal).
44. See FED. JUD. CR., supra note 14, at 2 (2002) (citing Act of May 8, 1792,
ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 278).
45. See id. (noting development of Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 23, § 20, 36 Stat.
1090).
46. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 872, 898, 908 (including contents of §§ 47, 144 and 455, respectively, in United States Code).
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tact.47 Each of these sections delineate rules for a discrete area of recusal
law, and the courts have subjected each section to extensive
48
interpretation.
2.

History of § 47: ProhibitionAgainst AppellateJudges Sitting on Cases They
Heard at Trial

Section 47 is generally recognized as both the clearest and easiest to
50
Section 47,
apply of the three recusal statutes, 4 9 as well as the least used.
consisting of a single sentence, prohibits appellate judges from sitting on
cases they oversaw at the trial level. 51 This prohibition dates back to the
formation of the federal courts, and was reiterated by Congress at the formation of the circuit courts of appeals. 52 Section 120 of the Judicial Code
of 1911 and the 1948 United States Code also retained and refined the
5
requirements for § 47 recusal. 3
47. For a discussion of the development of § 47, see infta notes 52-53 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the establishment and retention of § 144,
see infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the creation and
continuation of § 455, see infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
48. To compare the disparate language of §§ 47, 144 and 455, see supra notes
14-17.
49. See generally Joshua Glick, On the Road: The Supreme Court and the History of
Circuit Riding, 24 CARDozo L. Rrv. 1753, 1835-36 (2003) (examining § 47's interpretive history and noting courts have uniformly and easily filled in blanks left by
this one-sentence statute).
50. See FED. JUD. CR., supra note 14, at 52 (explaining that recusal rarely
occurs under § 47 because it appears to overlap with part (a) of more dominant
§ 455); Sheldon R. Shapiro, Annotation, Construction and Application of§ 47 ofJudicial Code (28 U.S.C.A. § 47), and Similar Predecessor Statutes, Disqualifying Judge of
United States Court of Appeals from Hearing or DeterminingAppeal from Decision of Case
Issued or Tried by Him, 13 A.L.R. FED. 855, 856-57 (1972) (noting that rule's application is limited to federal courts of appeals). See generally Note, Disqualificationof
Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 HARv. L. REv. 736 passim (1973) (commenting extensively on §§ 144 and 455, and referring to § 47 as "little-used" in
footnote).
51. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (quoting single sentence of § 47
in its entirety). Due to its structure, § 47 only applies to recently promoted judges
or those sitting on appeals courts by designation, and does not apply to judges
reviewing their own cases en banc. See FED. JUD. CR., supra note 14, at 1 (describing boundaries of § 47's application).
52. See Shapiro, supra note 50, at 856 (noting origins of § 47). The prohibition against sitting upon the rehearing of a case found in 28 U.S.C. § 47 first appeared in a 1792 statute. See id. (citing Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the
United States, 1 Stat. 73, 75 (1789)). The content was again stated in 1891. See id.
(citing Act to Establish Circuit Courts of Appeals and to Define and Regulate in
Certain Cases the Jurisdiction of the Courts of the United States, and for Other
Purposes, 26 Stat. 826, 827 (1891)).
53. See Shapiro, supra note 50, at 856-57 (continuing description of § 47's origins). The content of § 47 was preserved in Section 120 of the Judicial Code of
1911. See id. (citing Act to Codify, Revise and Amend the Law Relating to the
Judiciary, 36 Stat. 1087, 1132 (1911)). The prohibition was restated in a form
largely reflecting its present text in 1948. Id. (citing Act to Revise, Codify, and
Enact into Law Title 28 of the United States Code Entitled Judicial Code andJudi-
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Although the prohibition of § 47 is relatively clear, the circuit courts
have split regarding whether a waiver option may be inferred from the
statute. 54 The Supreme Court's most definitive position on the subject
was stated in Rexford v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 5 5 in which the Court
explained:
The terms of the statute .

. .

are both direct and comprehensive

[T] hat the parties may consent to the judge's participation
in its decision [ ] can make no difference, for the sole criterion
under the statute is, does the case in the circuit court of appeals
involve a question which the judge has tried or heard in the
56
course of the proceedings in the court below?
....

Despite-or arguably because of-the Rexford decision, the circuit courts
continue to disagree on the appropriateness of allowing waivers of § 47.57
Several circuits, including the Seventh and the Fourth, have focused
on the "direct and comprehensive" portion of the Supreme Court's analysis in Rexford.58 These circuits have determined that parties may not waive
the recusal requirement of § 47 under any circumstances. 59 The Third
Circuit, however, in United States v. Morrow, 60 focused on the second portion of Rexford, and interpreted § 47 to allow parties to waive recusal in
certain circumstances, including when counsel did not raise the motion at
61
trial.
ciary, 62 Stat. 869, 872 (1948)). Importantly, Congress enacted § 47 in 1948, although its contents were law long before this most recent enactment. See Glick,
supra note 49, at 1835 (discussing development of § 47's major requirements).
54. Compare Rexford v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 228 U.S. 339, 344
(1913) (noting that, in present situation, "consent given [to § 47 waiver] was of no
effect whatsoever"), and Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine Bldg. Co. v. Int'l Curtis
Marine Turbine Co., 228 U.S. 645, 650-51 (1913) (vacating court of appeals' decision due to "grave error" of including trial judge on appellate bench, despite § 47
waiver by parties), with United States v. Morrow, 717 F.2d 800, 801 n.1 (3d Cir.
1983) (determining that counsel's silence resulted in waiver of § 47 rights after
"having independently considered this matter").
55. 228 U.S. 339 (1913).
56. Id. at 34.
57. For a discussion of the apparent disagreement between the Third Circuit
and the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 47 in Rexford, see supra notes 54-61,
infra notes 97-113 and accompanying text.
58. See Russell v. Lane, 890 F.2d 947, 947-48 (7th Cir. 1989) (describing issue
of recusal in context of judicial participation in previous procedure); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 431 F.2d 135, 136 (4th Cir. 1970) (referring
to Rexford as guiding judicial precedent for assessing certainty of recusal).
59. See Russell, 890 F.2d at 948 (agreeing with Fourth Circuit that judge cannot sit on appellate bench of case he oversaw at trial, even in federal appellate
review of state court trial); Swann, 431 F.2d at 137 (concluding that trial judge
could not sit on appeal of case if appeal raises similar "ultimate question").
60. 717 F.2d 800 (3d Cir. 1983).
61. See id. at 801 n.1 (noting that, due to counsel's failure to file motion,
waiver occurred and thus "there is no basis for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 47....").
Morrow interpreted counsel's lack of a recusal motion to serve as a waiver. See id.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol50/iss5/5

8

Hall: The Road Less Traveled: The Third Circuit's Preservation of Judic

2005]
3.

CASEBRIEF

1273

History of § 144: Evaluating Affidavits of Bias

Section 144 requires judges to recuse themselves upon the filing of a
procedurally sufficient affidavit by counsel. 62 To be procedurally sufficient, the affidavit must state that the judge has a personal bias or
prejudice concerning one of the parties in the case. 63 This mandatory
recusal for bias developed later than the grounds included in § 47 or
§ 455; it was the Judicial Code of 1911 that first applied this requirement
to the federal courts. 64 The intent of the statute was reiterated in the 1948
65
United States Code and currently exists in largely the same form.
All circuits, with the notable exception of the Ninth, require that the
allegations of a § 144 affidavit be accepted as true. 66 Additionally, the allegations may be applied to both the trial at issue and any following trials
involving the judge and the party in question. 67 Thus, in both United States
(concluding that waiver occurred under § 47). Although facially conflicting with
the first clause of the Supreme Court's decision in Rexford, the Third Circuit's decision in Morrow may have a justification. See FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 14, at 53
(proposing justification for decision in Morrow). In Morrow, the court determined
that the appeal would not require a judge to rule on his own possible error,
whereas in Rexford, the judge's own error was at issue on appeal. See id. (considering justification for Third Circuit's decision).
62. For a discussion of the intent of § 144, see supra note 14 and accompanying text. Most courts require "strict compliance" with the procedural guidelines
for a § 144 affidavit. See FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 14, at 50 (quoting In re Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d 213, 218 (1st Cir. 1997)) (reviewing § 144 doctrine).
63. See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1949) (providing procedural requirements for motion). The affidavit must be signed by a party to a suit as to its truthfulness and by
counsel that it is procedurally valid. See FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 14, at 50-51
(outlining requirements court has inferred from § 144). Additionally, parties are
generally allowed to file only one affidavit, while later affidavits are not considered
even if new facts arise. See id. at 45 (detailing § 144's elements). Procedurally deficient affidavits may be allowed at the judge's discretion if good cause or no meaningful prejudice to the other party can be shown. See FLAMM, supra note 5, at 50710 (elaborating on courts' willingness to permit technically deficient affidavits).
64. See Hoekema, supra note 6, at 697, 702 (explaining origins of § 144 and
criticizing judicial gloss placed on recusal doctrine as having "narrowed the broad
scope Congress intended for disqualification law"); Note, DisqualificationofJudges
for Bias in the Federal Courts, 79 ILARv. L. Riv. 1435, 1436 (1966) (outlining statedriven early development of doctrine, only later applied to federal courts in Section 21 of Judicial Code of 1911 by ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1090).
65. See Note, supra note 64, at 1436 (describing retention of doctrine in
1948).
66. For a discussion of the § 144 affidavit views of the Ninth and other circuits, see infra notes 104-15 and accompanying text.
67. See FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 14, at 45-47 (describing differing applications of § 144). Compare United States v. Rankin, 870 F.2d 109, 110 (3d Cir. 1989)
(requiring that procedurally sufficient affidavits be accepted as true without further analysis), with Ronwin v. State Bar of Ariz., 686 F.2d 692, 701 (9th Cir. 1981),
rev'd on other grounds, Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 566 n.14 (1984) (allowing
judges limited discretion in determining validity of allegations for which they have
specific and personal knowledge).
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v. Rankin68 and Mims v. Shapp,69 the Third Circuit noted that if the proce-

dural requirements were met, the affidavit's allegations must be accepted
as true. 70 The Ninth Circuit took its unique minority position in Ronwin v.
State Bar of Arizona,71 which allowed judges limited judicial authority to
72
assess the truth of these affidavits.
4.

History of § 455: The Broadest Recusal Statute

Section 455 is the primary federal recusal statute, and was "expressly
designed to promote [public] confidence in the integrity of the judicial
process." 73 This section provides for recusal, either sua sponte or by motion, in the event that bias would be objectively perceived, that actual bias
exists or that a conflict of interests is present.7 4 Like § 47, this section
75
dates back to 1792, and has been updated several times.
Section 455's 1948 version is similar to the current version, except for
one important adjustment. 76 The 1948 version incorporated a subjective
standard, which lacked firm guidelines and was interpreted by the judici-

ary to include a "duty to sit"-a judicial gloss favoring non-recusal over
recusal in close questions.7 7 Congress revised the statute in 1974 to remove the duty to sit, and created an objective standard focused on preserving public faith in the fairness of the judicial process rather than
68. 870 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1989).
69. 541 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 1976).
70. See Rankin, 870 F.2d at 110 (requiring that procedurally sufficient affidavits be accepted as true without further analysis); Mims, 541 F.2d at 417 (requiring
thatjudge accept party's allegations as true-which judge denied-that judge had
chased and assaulted defendant in courtroom).
71. 686 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1982).
72. See id. at 701 (allowing judges limited discretion in determining validity of
procedurally valid allegations if they have personal knowledge).
73. FLAMM, supra note 5, at 36-37. Section 455 contains a lower threshold for
removal than does the Due Process Clause because it was designed to more strenuously police thejudiciary. See id. (discussing § 455); see also Hoekema, supra note 6,
at 698 (describing § 455 as "paramount disqualification statute").
74. See FED. JUD. CTR., supranote 14, at 2 (explaining requirements for § 455).
Unlike § 144, § 455 is applied to federal magistrates, judges and justices, and explicitly states that the rule may be waived by a negatively impacted party. See id.
(describing sections). Part (b), however, may not be waived as it applies to specific
circumstances, regardless of the appearance of impropriety. See id. at 1 (outlining
statute).
75. See id. at 2 (noting Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 278, and subsequent revisions, including Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 23, § 20, 36 Stat. 1090).
76. See id. (explaining problems Congress addressed in 1974 revisions to Act
of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 455, 62 Stat. 908).
77. See id. (describing problems with 1948 version of § 455). The judiciary
interpreted this subjective standard to create a duty to sit, thereby justifying their
reluctance to grant recusal motions. See Monroe H. Freedman, Duck-Blind Justice:
Justice Scalia's Memorandum in the Cheney Case, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 229, 234
(2004) (noting both subjective standard and complimentary duty to sit were removed by 1974 amendments).
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preserving judicial independence. 78 Although the Third Circuit has not
explicitly stated that close questions should be resolved in favor of recusal,
many circuits have done so. 7 9 Additionally, Third Circuit cases, including
81
80
In re School Asbestos Litigation, suggest agreement.
5.

Standard of Review for Recusal Motions First Brought on Appeal

Limited review exists for the denial of a recusal motion. 82 Almost all
circuits agree that if a motion for recusal is denied in district court, the
denial will be reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. 83 The Seventh Circuit is the lone dissenter to this standard, requiring de novo re84
view of recusal decisions on appeal.
Circuit courts, however, disagree on the applicable standard of review
if a recusal motion was not raised in district court. 85 In Selkridge v. United
78. See FED. Jul. CTR., supra note 14, at 2 (explaining revisions made in 1974).
This adjustment has been referred to as a "drastic change," and reflects Congress's
intent to create a recusal doctrine that is more objective and party-friendly. See

13A CHARLEs ALAN W~iGTrr ET AL., FEDERAL PRAcrIcE AND PROCEDURE § 3549 (2d
ed. 1984) (commenting on amendment's impact). The lack of a scienter requirement exemplifies the modification's intent to discourage a reading that is "overlynice" to sitting judges andjustices. See id. (explaining broad discretion available to
judges). One author has characterized these amendments as "the fear of perception run amok," and argues that Congress has overestimated the public's suspicion
of the judiciary, creating "scaredy-cat" judges. See Miner, supra note 7, at 1117
(postulating that unnecessarily low threshold of recusal doctrine is result of congressional misperception).
79. See FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 14, at 16 (noting that First, Fifth, Sixth,
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have adopted standards favoring recusal). The Supreme Court has specifically disapproved of multiple circuits' interpretations of
the amendments-designed to remove the duty to sit-in a manner retaining the
judicial gloss. See Waller v. United States, 504 U.S. 962, 964 (1992) (White, J.,
dissenting) (frowning on lower courts' creation and retention of duty to sit).
80. 977 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1992).
81. See id. at 784 (explaining that legislative history indicates that Congress
intended to remove duty to sit, and that recusal should occur despite detrimental
impact on plaintiffs and difficultly in transitioning to new judge).
82. See Selkridge v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co. (Selkridge I), 360 F.3d 155,
167 (3d Cir. 2004) (explaining appellate standard of review for recusal motions
denied at trial level).
83. See id. (describing inter-circuit agreement on standard of review for motions declined in district court); General Motors Corp. v. New A.C. Chevrolet, Inc.,
263 F.3d 296, 336 n.25 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that standard of review for denial of
recusal motion is abuse of discretion); Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom,
Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining abuse of discretion standard of
review for recusal denials). The Seventh Circuit has adopted a de novo standard
for appellate review of recusal decisions, whereas all other circuits have adopted an
abuse of discretion standard. See FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 14, at 65 (describing
standards of review).
84. See FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 14, at 65 (noting Seventh Circuit's unique
de novo review of denials of motions for recusal).
85. Compare Selkridge II, 360 F.3d at 167 (noting plain error standard of review), with Taylor v. Vt. Dep't of Educ., 313 F.3d 768, 795 (2d Cir. 2002) (declaring
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Omaha Life Insurance Co. (Selkridge II),86 the Third Circuit determined that
the plain error standard is appropriate for motions first brought on appeal. 8 7 Conversely, in Taylor v. Vermont Department of Education,8 8 the Second Circuit determined that the higher threshold of the fundamental
error analysis is applicable.8 9 Yet another standard is proposed by the First
Circuit in In re United States,90 requiring that a judge's decision to deny a
recusal motion be "unsupportable by a reasonable reading of the
record."9 1
III.

INTERPRETATION: INTER-CIRCUIT CONFLICTS AND THEIR
RESOLUTION BY THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Sections 47, 144 and 455 are designed to preserve (or achieve) the
goal of an unbiased judicial system in both fact and appearance. 92 Third
Circuit precedent has shown that there are multiple ways to achieve this
goal within the confines of the recusal statutes. 9 3 In general, the Third
Circuit's views are more sympathetic to the needs of the parties than the
needs of the judges, favoring judicial accountability over judicial indepenfundamental error standard applicable in review of recusal motions brought at
trial in civil cases).
86. 360 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 2004).
87. See id. at 167 (noting plain error as Third Circuit's standard of review for
recusal motions first brought on appeal). Plain error is defined as an error that
was sufficiently prejudicial as to impact the trial's outcome. See United States v.
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993) (defining standard). Once the appearance of
partiality is shown, prejudice is subject to a rebuttable presumption. See United
States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568, 573 n.7 (3d Cir. 1995) (outlining review process).
88. 313 F.3d 768 (2d Cir. 2002).
89. See id. at 795 (explaining that, in civil cases, fundamental error analysis is
applied); Antar, 53 F.3d at 573 n.6 (noting appeal of fundamental error analysis,
but using plain error due to agreement of both parties that plain error is appropriate standard). Fundamental error analysis requires an error "so serious and flagrant that it goes to the very integrity of the [proceeding]." Taylor, 313 F.3d at 795
(quotingJarvis v. Ford Motor Co., 283 F.3d 33, 62 (2d Cir. 2002)).
90. 666 F.2d 690 (1st Cir. 1981).
91. See id. at 695 n.* (1st Cir. 1981) (noting that standard is more strict than
that for judging Caesar's Wife-which requires that even suspicion of wrongdoing
be absent-and requiring that there be factual proof offered and that judge's decision reflect rational interpretation of that proof); see also In re Allied Signal Inc.,
891 F.2d 967, 970 (1st Cir. 1989) (subscribing to rational interpretation standard
of In re United States).
92. See Bassett, supra note 8, at 1218 (explaining that "[t]he aim of recusal
and disqualification is to ensure both actual judicial impartiality, which is a necessary prerequisite of due process, and the appearance of impartiality, which is necessary to ensure confidence in the courts").
93. For a discussion of circuit interpretations of Rexford, see supra notes 49-53,
infra 102-13 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the differences between
circuits regarding the amount of judicial discretion permitted in reviewing § 144
affidavits, see supra notes 58-61, infra notes 114-25 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of the different standards for reviewing appeals from denials of recusal
motions, see supra notes 85-91, infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
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dence. 9 4 The Third Circuit's pattern of favoring parties in close questions
is in contrast with the trends of both the Supreme Court and several other
circuits. 9 5 These interpretations have been applied to § 47 waiver provisions, the validity of § 144 affidavits and the standard of review for recusal
motions first brought on appeal. 96
A.

Inferring (or Not Inferring) a Waiver Provision in § 4 7

Section 47 is a short statute, and is by far the shortest of the three
recusal statutes. 9 7 Section 47 does not comment upon the applicability of
a waiver to its recusal requirement. 98 This differs from § 144, to which a
waiver provision is inapplicable, 99 and is unlike § 455, which explicitly
states what parts are subject to waiver. 100 Thus, it would appear that Congress addressed the waiver provision only when it deemed such an option
to be at issue (or arguably at issue), and through its comparative silence
determined that a waiver was not at issue here. 10 1 The Supreme Court
considered this legislative comparison in Rexford, noting the brevity and
directness of § 47 and determining that Congress did not intend for the
10 2
availability of waivers to be inferred.
94. Compare supra note 85 and accompanying text (explaining difference in
interpretation of several issues between Third Circuit and other circuits), with VoLCANSEK, supra note 10, at 127 (noting uniformity of independence over accountability in judicial systems of United States, Britain, France and Italy).
95. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's views in comparison with those of
other circuits, see supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
96. For a contrast of the Third Circuit's recusal doctrine with those of other
circuits, see supra note 85 and accompanying text.
97. Compare supra note 16 and accompanying text (reciting full text of § 47),
with supra note 15 and accompanying text (repeating § 144 in its entirety), and
supra note 17 and accompanying text (presenting primary portions of § 455).
98. See 28 U.S.C. § 47 (2005) (lacking any language concerning waiver of
§ 47-based recusal).
99. See Diana Lowndes, Authority of the TrialJudge, 90 GEO. L.J. 1659, 1661-62
(2002) (noting that recusal motions under § 144, if found to be timely and legally
sufficient, are self-activating). Section 144 becomes effective only upon a motion
by a party. See id. (outlining requirements of § 144). Thus, a waiver provision is
unnecessary for two reasons: first, logic dictates that a waiver will not come from a
party that has made a motion questioning the judge's neutrality in the case at
hand; second, such a motion-if timely and legally sufficient-is self-activating. See

id. (describing workings of § 144).
100. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(e) (2005) (stating that violation of part (a) may be
waived by parties if preceded by judge's "full disclosure on the record of the basis
for disqualification," and that violation of part (b) cannot be waived under any
circumstances).
101. Compare supra note 99 and accompanying text (explaining that it would
be illogical to include waiver provision in § 144), with supranote 100 and accompanying text (reciting waiver language in § 455).
102. See Rexford v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 228 U.S. 339, 343-44
(1913) (explaining that statute's terms are "direct and comprehensive" and do not
allow for waiver).
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The Third Circuit considered the possibility of a § 47 waiver in Morrow
10 3
Morand determined that the defendant had waived his recusal option.
row involved the appeal of an arson conviction from the Western District
of Pennsylvania.1 0 4 Although the trial judge also sat by designation on the
panel in the court of appeals, the court found there was no violation of
§ 47.105 The court justified its finding by noting that the defendant's
counsel was informed that the trial judge would be sitting on the appeal,
and "indicated no motion for recusal would be filed and [therefore]
recusal was waived." 10 6 As such, the Third Circuit has appended a clause
to § 47 through interpretation, reading the statute as: "No judge shall hear
or determine an appeal from the decision of a case or issue tried by [the
10 7
judge]" unless a waiver has ensued from the negatively impacted party.
The goal of the recusal statutes is two-fold.10 8 First, the statutes are to
preserve the judge's role as a neutral party overseeing cases. 10 9 Second,
the statutes are to preserve the public's perception of the judge as a neutral party. 10 Congress has specifically acted to remove both the duty to sit
and the subjective standard from the ambiguous § 455, both of which appear to be asserted by the court in its interpretation of § 47.111 In Morrow,
a three-judge panel (including the judge in question) collectively determined that a judge accused of partiality could function in an unbiased
103. See United States v. Morrow, 717 F.2d 800, 801 n.1 (3d Cir. 1983) (finding that lack of motion to recuse during trial removed defendant's ability to recuse
on appeal under either § 47 or § 455). The court did accurately rule that any
opportunity for a § 455(a) recusal claim was waived after counsel declined to do so
following a full disclosure on the record, as per the requirements of § 455(a).
Compare id. (deciding right to recuse was waived), with 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) 2005
(explicitly allowing waiver of recusal).
104. See Morrow, 717 F.2d at 801 n.1 (denying motion claiming error due to
judge's presence on bench of both trial and appeal after inferring waiver because
of lack of motion at trial).
105. See id. (delineating court's reasoning for denying § 47-based appeal).
106. See id. (explaining determination that waiver of recusal had occurred after "[h]aving independently considered this matter").
107. See 28 U.S.C. § 47; supra notes 97-98 (describing court's interpretation of
§ 47 to include non-explicit waiver provision).
108. See Hoekema, supra note 6, at 697 (arguing that "[a] n impartial judiciary
is an essential element of the system ofjustice in the United States," and that "Congress has sought to secure the impartiality of trial judges by requiring judges to
disqualify themselves in various circumstances"); Miner, supra note 7, at 1110 (determining that "in modern-day society, it is perception, rather than reality, that has
the greater importance").
109. See Hoekema, supra note 6, at 697 (explaining Congress's preservation of
judicial impartiality through recusal statutes).
110. See Miner, supra note 7, at 1110 (placing need for judicial impartiality in
perception above judicial impartiality in fact).
111. See Morrow, 717 F.2d at 801 n.1 (noting that after "[h]aving independently considered this matter," panel determined there was no need for judge who
wrote trial opinion to recuse himself from appeal panel, and also noted that any
recusal-based appeal had been waived through counsel's silence).
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way. 1 12 Morrow's "judgmentcall" is precisely the kind of self-interested ruling that Congress acted to remove from the bench by enacting § 47 in the
interest of preserving an unbiased judicial system in both appearance and
13
fact.'
B.

Assessing the Validity of a § 144 Affidavit

The Ninth Circuit stands as the lone dissenter to the rule that the
truthfulness of a § 144 affidavit may not be challenged.' 14 In the majority
of circuits, including the Third Circuit, affidavits are reviewed only for particularity under the "convince a reasonable person" test. 115 The differing
standards applied by the circuits highlight the fundamental difference in
their approaches to § 144.116 Thus,judges in the majority of circuits may
be forced to legally accept bizarre accusations against them, despite their
personal knowledge that the allegations are factually untrue."17 The ma112. See id. (affirming trial judge's denial of recusal motion).
113. See id. (explaining independent review ofjudge's ability to fulfill his role
in unbiased nature by threejudge panel including judge in question); supra note
15 and accompanying text (including § 47 in its entirety, lacking any waiver
section).
114. See FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 14, at 46 (describing Ninth Circuit as having taken "different approach" in allowing judge to deny truthfulness of § 144
affidavit).
115. See id. at 46-48 (compiling individual circuits' interpretations of majority
standard).
116. Compare Mims v. Shapp, 541 F.2d 415, 417 (3d Cir. 1976) (using movantfriendly standard of assumed validity of procedurally valid affidavit), with Ronwin v.
State Bar of Ariz., 686 F.2d 692, 701 (9th Cir. 1981) (using judge-friendly standard
and allowing judges to rule on truthfulness of assertions to which judges have personal knowledge).
117. See United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 53 (3d Cir. 1976) (describing
circuit's test, requiring facts sufficient to convince reasonable person of judge's
personal bias against party when facts are taken as true); Mims, 541 F.2d at 416-17
(requiring that judge accept party's allegations-which judge had denied-that
judge had chased party around room and assaulted party). The First Circuit has
proposed a solution to the dilemma of forcing judges to accept extreme accusations they know to be untrue. See In re Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d 213, 218 (1st Cir.
1997) (describing First Circuit's test). When cases are transferred due to § 144
allegations in the First Circuit, the new judge may hold a hearing concerning the
truthfulness of the affidavit and return cases in which the affidavits are found to be
false. See id. (noting First Circuit recusal procedure). Even among the other circuits, the general trend is to require specific allegations that would convince a
reasonable person rather than relying on a party's broad and sweeping accusations. See id. (describing other circuits); United States v. Sykes, 7 F.3d 1331, 1339
(7th Cir. 1993) (describing Seventh Circuit's standard); FED. JuD. CTR., supra note
14, at 46-48 (noting discrepant standards across circuits). The Third Circuit, however, has retained a strong stance in favor of recusal, disallowing judicial discretion
concerning validity. See United States v. Rankin, 870 F.2d 109, 112 (3d Cir. 1989)
(disallowing discretion of trial judge to require greater specificity in recusal affidavit); Mimi, 541 F.2d at 417 (requiring trial judge to accept facts in recusal motion
as true and rule only on legal sufficiency of motion); FED.JUD. CTR., supra note 14,
at 46-48 (describing different standards of circuits).
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jority approach is designed to prevent conflicts that result from judges rul118
ing on the factuality of motions that may be damaging to themselves.
In Rankin, the defendant moved to transfer the case, requesting
recusal because the assigned judge had allegedly chased him around the
courtroom and assaulted him. 119 Although these accusations were bizarre, it is easy to see the conflict of interest that the judge would face in
ruling upon the validity of the motion-especially if the accusations were
true. 120 The judge would either have to admit embarrassing and unprofessional conduct or rule against the defendant. 12 ' As such, any denial of
the
the motion would be suspect; precisely the self-interested decisions
12 2
recusal doctrine is designed to eliminate from court discretion.
The Ninth Circuit's approach, however, allows the judge to rule on
the factuality of the allegations because they are, by their very nature,
within the judge's personal knowledge. 123 This approach places considerably more faith in a judge's ability and desire to maintain neutrality-as
well as the public's belief in the judge's ability to maintain this neutralitythan does the Third Circuit's approach. 124 The Ninth Circuit's judgefriendly rule is much more reflective of the American trend toward judicial independence, whereas the Third Circuit's party-friendly rule is loyal
118. See 48A C.J.S. Judges § 312 (2004) (explaining that "disqualification rule
limiting the trial judge to a bare determination of legal sufficiency was designed to
prevent the creation of an intolerable adversary atmosphere between the trial
judge and the litigant").
119. See Rankin, 870 F.2d at 110 (describing plaintiffs allegations).
120. See id. at 110 n.1 (noting that accusations were highly questionable and
directly contradicted by claimant's counsel). The claimant and his family, who
supported the allegations, were later charged with perjury. See id. at 110-12
(describing perjury issue).
121. See Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 36 (1921) (explaining that "evil"
of conflicted and biased review was precisely what statute was designed to prevent,
and that appeal is insufficient method to check this bias); United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1203 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that "a judge may be especially
reluctant to recuse himself when to do so requires him to admit that his actual bias
or prejudice has been proved"). See generally Hoekema, supra note 6, at 707 n.74
(1987) (concluding that in history of § 455, judges have been reluctant to recuse
themselves when it requires admission of actual bias).

122. See Berger, 255 U.S. at 36 (decrying appeal as unable to correct problems
inherent in judge's conflicted and biased review of his own actions).
123. See FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 14, at 46 (noting instance where judge was
allowed to rule upon truth of allegations because facts were peculiarly within
judge's knowledge).
124. Compare id. (explaining that Ninth Circuit's actual bias-focused decision
"held that recusal was unnecessary in part because the judge knew the allegations
were false"), with Selkridge II, 360 F.3d 155, 170 (3d Cir. 2004) (focusing on public

perception). Notably, one of the court's primary issues in Selkridge H was "the appearance thatJudge Moore's impartiality was compromised." Id. (concluding that
Judge Moore's grounds for recusal were too narrow). The court's holding noted
the compromise of the appearance of partiality prior to noting the actual partiality. See id. (considering both actual and perceived partiality in its review).
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to the recusal statutes' theme of removing the appearance and existence
12 5
of judicial interest or bias.
C.

The Split Over the Standard of Review for Recusal Motions
First Brought on Appeal

The disagreement between the Third and Second Circuits over the
appropriate standard of review for recusal motions first brought on appeal
is based on their differing interpretations of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). 12 6 Rule 52(b) requires plain error review for motions first
brought on appeal. 12 7 The Third Circuit applies this plain error standard
to all motions brought upon appeal, regardless of whether they are raised
128
in civil or criminal cases.
In contrast, the Second Circuit focuses on the fact that Rule 52(b) is a
criminal rule, and thus applies the plain error standard only to motions
first brought on appeal in criminal cases. 129 In civil cases, these motions
are subjected to fundamental error analysis. 13 0 The less stringent plain
error standard is applied in criminal cases because more substantial personal liberty interests are at stake than the economic and property interests generally at stake in civil cases.13 1 In Selkridge II, the Third Circuit
noted the appeal of the Second Circuit's dual standard of review, but ultimately reasserted its uniform standard.' 3 2 The Third Circuit's uniform
125. Compare supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text (noting American
trend to favor judicial independence over accountability), with infra note 138 and
accompanying text (defining recusal's twin goals as "preventing the appearance of
partiality and preventing bias by the bench").
126. Compare infra notes 128, 133 (describing Third Circuit's adoption of
plain error standard for review of all recusal motion determinations), with infra
notes 129-32 (analyzing Second Circuit's application of fundamental error standard to civil cases and plain error standard to criminal cases).
127. See United States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568, 573 (3d Cir. 1995) (explaining
that plain error doctrine is derived from Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
52(b) which "provides that '[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights
may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court'").
128. See Selkridge 1, 360 F.3d at 166 n.16 (addressing standard of review by
noting that, regardless of Second Circuit's applied standard, Third Circuit applies
plain error review to all recusal motions first brought on appeal).
129. See Taylor v. Vt. Dep't of Educ., 313 F.3d 768, 795 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting
that plain error "'can excuse a procedural default in a criminal trial'" and that civil
cases are reviewed for fundamental error (quoting Jarvis v. Ford Motor Co., 283
F.3d 33, 62 (2d Cir. 2002))); United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116, 127-28 (2d Cir.
2000) (describing four-part plain error standard to apply to recusal motion first
brought on criminal case's appeal).
130. See Taylor, 313 F.3d at 795 (noting different standards of review in criminal and civil contexts).
131. See Deppe v. Tripp, 863 F.2d 1356, 1364-65 (7th Cir. 1988) (differentiating between easily remedied civil case errors and relatively difficult to remedy
criminal case errors).
132. See Selkridge I, 360 F.3d at 166 n.16 (explaining appeal of Second Circuit's analysis). The Selkridge II court specifically noted the appeal of the Second
Circuit's logic, which draws upon the limitation of Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
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standard is more favorable to litigants and better preserves the bench's
133
neutrality, despite the greater ease of forcing recusal.
The First Circuit's reasonable interpretation standard is not based on
a reading of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, but rather upon
striking the proper balance between preserving the public appearance of
impartial proceedings and preventing the manipulation ofjudicial recusal
to obtain more favorable judges.134 This standard requires that the reviewing judges be able to conceive of a reasonable explanation for the
motion's denial.1 3 5 As a result, the First Circuit, like the Second Circuit,
has developed a doctrine more hostile to successful recusal motions than
136
the Third Circuit.
IV.

CONCLUSION: THE PRO-MoVANT THIRD CIRCUIT PROVIDES

RELATIVELY GREATER OPPORTUNITY FOR RECUSAL
The American judicial system is premised upon the existence of a

neutral bench enforcing the laws while adversarial parties debate the merits of the case before a jury. 137 Thus, recusal-a remedy designed to remove a judge who lacks this neutrality-is a difficult subject for the
American system of justice. 13 8 The circuit conflicts addressed reflect the
dure 52(b)'s application to criminal cases. See id. (considering different standard
applied in Second Circuit).
133. Compare Taylor, 313 F.3d at 795 (defining fundamental error as "more
egregious than the 'plain' error [standard] that can excuse a procedural default in
a criminal trial, and [an error that] is so serious and flagrant that it goes to the very
integrity of the [proceeding]" (quoting Jarvis v. Ford Motor Co., 283 F.3d 33, 62
(2d Cir. 2002))) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted), with United
States v. Schreiber, 599 F.2d 534, 535 (3d Cir. 1979) (defining plain error as error
representing "manifest miscarriage of justice" (quoting United States v.
Provenzano, 334 F.2d 678, 690 (3d Cir. 1964))). Other circuits, including the Seventh Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit, have applied an abuse of discretion standard. See id. at 535 n.1 (referencing conflict with standard of other
circuits).
134. See In re Allied-Signal Inc., 891 F.2d 967, 970 (1st Cir. 1989) (justifying
First Circuit's standard of review for denial of recusal motions).
135. See id. (describing requirements of reasonable interpretation standard of
review).
136. For a comparison of the standard of review for recusal motion appeals in
the Third and Second Circuits, see supranotes 126-33 and accompanying text (noting that fundamental error standard has higher threshold than plain error standard). See also supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text (describing low
threshold of reasonable interpretation standard).
137. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 54 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "adversary system" as "a procedural system, such as the Anglo-American legal system, involving
active and unhindered parties contesting with each other to put forth a case before
an independent decision-maker").
138. See Hoekema, supra note 6, passim (discussing inherent theoretical conflict in questioning neutrality of decisionmaker in adversarial system).
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difficulty of striking a balance between maintaining the neutrality of the
1 39
bench and preserving judicial independence.
Parties seeking recusal under any of the three applicable statutes must
understand that, although they provide some firm rules, much of judicial
disqualification doctrine remains a gray area that is subject to judicial interpretation and discretion. 140 Entering these gray areas is unquestionably dangerous, as "[a]n attorney's decision whether to move for
consequences on the subsedisqualification of a judge can have serious
141
case."
attorney's]
[the
of
quent handling
Parties seeking recusal, however, should be aware that the Third Circuit has resolved a relatively large number of disputed issues in favor of
permitting recusal. 142 In doing so, the Third Circuit has not only developed as a more party-friendly venue than other circuits, but also remains
faithful to the twin philosophical pillars of the recusal statutes-preventing the appearance of partiality and preventing actual bias by the
143
bench.
Jay Hall

139. See VOLCANSEK, supra note 10, at 2 (noting modem democratic conflict
between preserving judicial independence and ensuring judicial neutrality).
140. See id. at xlii (noting that "general principles are extremely hard to come
by" in this area of law because it is driven by myriad sources, including statutes,
constitutional provisions and court rules); Malarkey, supra note 30, at 695 (noting
that "what constitutes a proper ground for judicial disqualification, however, remains a troublesome question facing both attorneys and judges").
141. See Malarkey, supra note 30, at 695 (observing that "[i]f you are going to
shoot at the judge it does no good to wound him" (quoting Davis & Levin, Disqualifying Judges, LITIG., Winter 1981, at 11)); FLAMM, supra note 5, 25-27 (1996) (explaining that "the filing of a judicial disqualification may antagonize the
challenged judge either consciously or subconsciously, with the result that the
moving litigants and their counsel are likely to suffer") (citations omitted).
142. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's interpretation of Rexford and its
refusal to recognize an inference of waiver in § 47, see supra notes 54-61, 103-07
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's policy regarding
the amount ofjudicial discretion permitted in reviewing § 144 affidavits, see supra
notes 67-70, 114-25 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's
standard of review for appeals from denials of recusal motions, see supra notes 8291, 126-36 and accompanying text.
143. See FED. JUD. CR., supranote 14, at v (stating that parties "move for trial
judges to recuse themselves on grounds of partiality or the appearance of partiality"). For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's pro-movant interpretation of
§ 47, denying waiver of this section, see supra notes 54-61, 103-07 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's level ofjudicial discretion
in determining the admissibility of § 144 affidavits, see supra notes 67-70, 114-25
and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's standard of
review for denials of recusal motions, see supranotes 82-91, 126-36 and accompanying text.
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